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We propose a dynamical model in which a network structure evolves in a self-organized critical
(SOC) manner and explain a possible origin of the emergence of fractal and small-world networks.
Our model combines a network growth and its decay by failures of nodes. The decay mechanism
reflects the instability of large functional networks against cascading overload failures. It is demon-
strated that the dynamical system surely exhibits SOC characteristics, such as power-law forms of
the avalanche size distribution, the cluster size distribution, and the distribution of the time interval
between intermittent avalanches. During the network evolution, fractal networks are spontaneously
generated when networks experience critical cascades of failures that lead to a percolation transition.
In contrast, networks far from criticality have small-world structures. We also observe the crossover
behavior from fractal to small-world structure in the network evolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex systems consisting of discrete elements and
their pair interactions can be described by networks.
Many of large-scale networks representing complexity
of the real world are known to have common proper-
ties in their topology [1–3], such as the scale-free prop-
erty [4], degree correlations [5, 6], or community struc-
tures [7]. In particular, structures of real-world net-
works are classified into two types from a viewpoint
of the relation between the number of nodes and the
path length, namely small-world structures [8] and frac-
tal structures [9]. For a small-world network, the av-
erage path length 〈l〉 is extremely small comparing to
the network size N and increases at most logarithmi-
cally with N , i.e., 〈l〉 ∝ logN . Numerous real-world
complex networks possess the small-world property [10–
13]. On the other hand, a network is called fractal if
the relation NB(lB) ∝ l
−dB
B holds, where NB(lB) is the
minimum number of subgraphs of diameter less than lB
required to cover the network and dB is the fractal di-
mension [9]. Since this relation at lB ∼ 〈l〉 suggests the
power-law scaling 〈l〉 ∝ N1/dB [14], the fractal nature
seems to conflict with the small-world property. Never-
theless, real complex networks that are small world in
the sense of 〈l〉 ∝ logN often satisfy the fractal scaling
NB(lB) ∝ l
−dB
B , as observed in the world-wide web, ac-
tor networks, protein interaction networks, cellular net-
works [9], power-grid networks [15], and software net-
works [16, 17]. This apparent inconsistency can be rec-
onciled by taking into account a structural crossover from
fractal to small-world scaling associated with the change
in length scale [14].
It is well understood that the small-world property
arises from the existence of short-cut edges [8]. Only
a tiny amount of short-cut edges added into a non-
small-world network drastically reduces the average path
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length. In contrast, the microscopic mechanism of the
emergence of fractality in complex networks still remains
unclear though fractal networks and their relation to
the scale-free property have been extensively studied
[9, 14, 18–24]. It is thus also not understood why there
exist small-world and fractal networks in the real world
and how fractal networks crossover to small-world ones.
In order to deal with these problems, it is significant to
remind that many conventional fractal objects embedded
in the Euclidean space are formed by dynamics exhibiting
self-organized criticality [25–31]. In self-organized criti-
cal (SOC) dynamics, a system approaches spontaneously
a critical point without tuning external parameters and
fluctuates around the critical state due to the instabil-
ity of the critical or near-critical states. One of the re-
markable features of SOC dynamics is that stationary
fluctuations around criticality are accompanied by inter-
mittent, avalanche-like bursts of some sort of dynamical
quantities, in which the avalanche size distribution obeys
a power law. It is natural to consider that fractal complex
networks are also formed by SOC dynamics.
SOC dynamics on static complex networks have been
extensively studied in previous works [27, 32–41]. How-
ever, for the construction of fractal networks through
SOC dynamics, we need to consider the interplay be-
tween internal dynamics and the network topology [42–
44], by which the network evolution itself displays SOC
characteristics. There have been many models of net-
work evolution driven by internal dynamics related to
self-organized criticality, such as models based on the
Bak-Sneppen dynamics [45–47], other models of ecologi-
cal systems [48], models related to the sandpile dynamics
[49–51], a model describing the motion of solar flares [52],
and rewiring models based on state changes of nodes or
edges [53–56]. Although these models generate nontriv-
ial networks through the couplings to internal dynamics,
it is difficult to say that fractal networks are formed by
SOC dynamics in these models because of the lack of in-
termittent, avalanche-like behavior of network structures
[45, 53, 54], the necessity of parameter tuning for criti-
cality [47, 55], or the absence of fractality in generated
networks [46, 48–52, 55, 56].
2In this paper, we present a model of fractal networks
formed by SOC dynamics. Taking into account the evolu-
tion of real networks, the network instability required for
SOC dynamics is realized by overload failures of nodes.
In general, when the size of a functional network becomes
large, the probability that all nodes in the network can
escape failures decreases. Failure(s) on a single or a few
nodes can cause a cascade of overload failures, and the
network decays into smaller ones. Our model combines a
network growth by introducing new nodes and its decay
due to the instability of large grown networks against cas-
cading overload failures. It is numerically demonstrated
that the present dynamical system exhibits self-organized
criticality and the network evolution generates both frac-
tal and small-world networks. Furthermore, the crossover
behavior from fractal to small-world structure has been
observed in SOC dynamics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we formulate the model combining a network
growth with cascading overload failures induced by fluc-
tuating loads. Our numerical results are presented in
Sect. 3. In this section, we show the time development of
several measures describing the network structure, SOC
character of the dynamics, and the fractal and small-
world properties of networks generated in SOC dynamics.
Section 4 is devoted to the summary.
II. MODEL
A. Network instability — Cascading overload
failures
In the present work, the instability required to con-
struct an SOC model is realized by cascading overload
failures in large networks. Our daily life is supported by
various functional networks, such as power grids, com-
puter networks, the world-wide web, etc. Functions of
networks are achieved by some sort of flow which plays,
at the same time, a role of loads in the network. The
load on a node usually fluctuates temporally and its in-
stantaneous value exceeding the allowable range causes
a failure of node. This overload failure may induce a
cascade of subsequent failures which reduces, sometimes
greatly, the network size. Such cascades of failures pro-
vide the instability of networks. Recently, the robustness
of a network against cascading overload failures induced
by temporally fluctuating loads has been studied [57],
This study employs the random walker model proposed
by Kishore et al.[58, 59], in which fluctuating loads are
described by random walkers moving on a network. Since
our model is based on the study by Ref. IV, we briefly
review this work.
In the random walker model [58–60], we consider W0
non-interacting random walkers moving on a connected
and undirected network with M0 edges. Walkers on a
node represent the temporally fluctuating load imposed
on the node. Since the stationary probability pk to find
a walker on a node of degree k is given by pk = k/2M0
[61], the probability that there exist w walkers on the
degree-k node is presented by
hk(w) =
(
W0
w
)
pwk (1− pk)
W0−w. (1)
This binomial distribution gives the average load on the
degree-k node as 〈w〉k = W0pk and the standard devi-
ation σk =
√
〈w〉k(1− pk). It is then natural to define
the capacity of a node of degree k as
qk = 〈w〉k +mσk, (2)
where m is a real positive parameter and characterizes
the tolerance of the node to load. A node is considered
to fail if the number of walkers w on the node exceeds this
capacity. Therefore, the probability FW0 (k) that a node
of degree k experiences an overload failure is calculated
by summing up the distribution function hk(w) over w
larger than qk. Using the regularized incomplete beta
function Ix(a, b) for this summation [62], the overload
probability is expressed as [58]
FW0(k) = Ik/2M0 (⌊qk⌋+ 1,W0 − ⌊qk⌋), (3)
where the floor function ⌊x⌋ represents the greatest inte-
ger less than or equal to x.
Applying the above idea of the overload probability, a
cascade of failures starting with a specific large network
can be described as follows [57].
(i) Prepare an initial connected, undirected, and un-
correlated network G0 withN0 nodes andM0 edges,
in which W0 random walkers exist, where W0 is
chosen so as to be proportional to M0. In addition,
determine the capacity qk of each node by Eq. (2).
(ii) At each time step τ , assign Wτ random walkers to
the network Gτ at step τ , where the total load Wτ
is given by
Wτ = W0
(
Mτ
M0
)r
. (4)
HereMτ is the total number of edges in the network
Gτ and r is a real positive parameter.
(iii) Calculate the overload probability of every node,
and remove nodes from Gτ with this probability.
(iv) Repeat (ii) and (iii) until no node is removed in the
procedure (iii).
The reduction of the total load in the procedure (ii) cor-
responds to actual cascades of failures during which the
total load is reduced to some extent to prevent the break-
down of the network function. We call the exponent r in
Eq. (4) the load reduction parameter hereafter. It should
be emphasized that the overload probability in the pro-
cedure (iii) cannot be calculated by Eq. (3) with W0 re-
placed by Wτ for the following two reasons. First, the
3degree k of a node in the network Gτ is not the same with
its initial degree k0. The capacity of a node is determined
by the initial degree k0, while the probability to find a
walker on this node is proportional to the present de-
gree k. Thus, the overload probability depends on both
k and k0. Secondly, the network Gτ is not necessarily
connected, though the initial network G0 is connected. If
Gτ is not connected, Wτ random walkers are distributed
to each component in proportion to the number of edges
in the component, before starting the next cascade step.
Taking into account these remarks and the fact that ran-
dom walkers cannot jump to other components, the over-
load probability of a node of degree k, whose initial de-
gree is k0, in the α-th component of Gτ is given by
FWα
τ
(k0, k) = Ik/2Mα
τ
(⌊qk0⌋+ 1,W
α
τ − ⌊qk0⌋) , (5)
where Mατ is the number of edges in the α-th component
of Gτ and W
α
τ = WτM
α
τ /Mτ is the load assigned to the
α-th component. Since k is always equal to k0 and the
network Gτ is connected at τ = 0, FWα
τ
(k0, k) at τ = 0
coincides with FW0(k) given by Eq. (3). Thus, Eq. (5) is
a general form of the overload probability for τ ≥ 0.
The relative size Sf of the giant component in the net-
work Gf at the final stage of the cascade process is an
important quantity to evaluate the robustness of net-
works against cascading overload failures. This quan-
tity Sf can be calculated by combining the generating
function method [63] and the master equation for the
probability Πτ (k0, k) that a node in Gτ has the present
degree k and the initial degree k0, without simulating
numerically the cascade process (i)–(iv) [57]. By means
of this method, it has been clarified that there exists a
threshold value of the load reduction parameter rc(N0)
above which Sf becomes finite and below which Sf = 0
and rc(N0) for N0 →∞ provides a percolation transition
by cascading overload failures [57]. The critical property
of Gf at r = rc has also been confirmed by the fractality
of the giant component in Gf. These facts will be closely
related to the results of the present work. However, in
the case that the structure and node capacities of a net-
work with which the cascade starts depend on results of
cascading failures occurring in the past, as in the model
of this work, it is unfortunately impossible to apply the
method utilizing the generating function. In such a case,
we need to simulate numerically the process (i)–(iv) to
find the final network state after a cascade.
B. Network evolution
The basic idea of our dynamical model is to combine
the growth of a network and its decay into smaller ones
by cascading overload failures. The overload probability
FW0(k) given by Eq. (3) is almost independent of M0
if W0 ∝ M0. However, the probability that the first
failures inducing a cascade of subsequent failures occur
in the network increases with the network growth. Thus,
we expect that the network cannot grow infinitely and its
size fluctuates around a certain value. Since our model
includes two different types of dynamics, i.e., growth and
cascade of failures, in order to distinguish them clearly, a
time step of the network growth is hereafter denoted by
t in parentheses and a cascade step by subscript τ . The
concrete algorithm of the network evolution in our model
is then given as follows:
(1) Start with a small and connected network G(0) with
Nini nodes and Mini edges, in which Wini random
walkers exist. Wini is set as Wini = aMini, where a
is a positive constant. The capacities of the nodes
in G(0) are calculated by Eq. (2).
(2) At every time step t ≥ 1, add a new node with µ
edges, where µ is in the range of 2 ≤ µ ≤ Nini, and
connect the new node to µ different nodes selected
randomly from the network G(t− 1) at time t− 1.
Let G0(t) be the network at this stage.
(3) Place W0(t) = aM0(t) random walkers on the net-
work G0(t), where M0(t) is the number of edges in
G0(t), and calculate the capacity of the new node
by using Eq. (2) with k replaced by µ and for the
total load W0(t).
(4) Perform cascading overload failures starting with
G0(t) in accordance with the process (i)–(iv) de-
scribed in Sect. II A. In this cascade process, iso-
lated zero-degree nodes generated by the elimina-
tion of all their adjacent nodes, in addition to the
overloaded nodes themselves, are removed from the
system. Let G(t) be the resultant network after
completing the cascade.
(5) Repeat the procedure from (2) to (4) for a suffi-
ciently long period.
We should make several remarks concerning the above
algorithm. In the procedure (2), the number of edges µ
of a newly added node must be larger than 2. Other-
wise, once the network is divided into disconnected com-
ponents by cascading failures, components never merge.
The network after a long time becomes an assembly of a
large number of small graphs. Thus, the dynamical sys-
tem has a qualitatively different property from that for
µ ≥ 2. It should be also emphasized that the network
G0(t) is not necessarily connected. If G0(t) consists of
plural components, the total load W0(t) is distributed to
each component in the same way as the case of cascad-
ing failures. Namely, the number of walkers in the α-th
component is allocated by
Wα0 (t) = W0(t)
[
Mα0 (t)
M0(t)
]
= aMα0 (t), (6)
where Mα0 (t) is the number of edges in the α-th compo-
nent of G0(t). The calculation of the new-node capacity
in the procedure (3) is actually done by using Wα0 (t), be-
cause random walkers cannot move to other components.
4The capacity of the node that is introduced at time t and
embedded in the α-th component is then presented by
qα(t) = 〈w〉µ +mσ
α
µ , (7)
where 〈w〉µ = W
α
0 (t)p
α
µ = aµ/2, σ
α
µ =
√
〈w〉µ(1− pαµ),
and pαµ = µ/2M
α
0 (t). Once the node capacity is deter-
mined, the value of q never changes until the node is
eliminated.
The process of cascading overload failures in the pro-
cedure (4) basically follows the steps (i)–(iv) in Sect. II A
with replacing G0, N0, M0, and W0 by G0(t), N0(t),
M0(t), and W0(t), respectively, where N0(t) is the num-
ber of nodes in G0(t). In addition to the possibility of
G0(t) being disconnected, there are two other differences
in the detailed treatment of the cascade process. Firstly,
the overload probability of a node cannot be written as
Eq. (5). This is because the node capacity given by
Eq. (7) depends on when the node was introduced in
the system. Thus, the overload probability of the node i
at cascade step τ is written as
FWα
τ
(t)(i) = Iki/2Mατ (t)
(
⌊qβ(ti)⌋+ 1,W
α
τ (t)− ⌊q
β(ti)⌋
)
,
(8)
where ki is the degree of the node i, ti is the time at
which the node i was introduced, α and β are the indices
of the components to which the node i belongs at the
present cascade step τ and at ti, respectively, and q
β(ti)
is presented by Eq. (7). The symbols Wατ (t) and M
α
τ (t)
represent the number of random walkers and number of
edges in the α-th component of Gτ (t), where Gτ (t) is the
network at the step τ of the cascade starting with G0(t).
The second difference is in the load reduction scheme dur-
ing the cascade. In Sect. II A, the total number of random
walkers is reduced in accordance with the reduction of the
network size during the cascade, as expressed by Eq. (4),
to prevent the breakdown of the network function. It is
actually difficult to reduce quickly the total load when the
network size becomes large. Taking into account such re-
alistic situations of cascading failures, the load reduction
parameter r characterizing how quickly the total load is
reduced with the reduction of the network size should
decrease with N0(t). Therefore, the total load during the
cascade is reduced according to
Wτ (t) = W0(t)
[
Mτ (t)
M0(t)
]r[N0(t)]
, (9)
whereMτ (t) is the number of edges in Gτ (t) and r[N0(t)]
is a decreasing function of N0(t). Since large-scale cas-
cades are more likely to occur if r is small, the property
that r[N0(t)] decreases with N0(t) prevents the network
from growing too large.
If all nodes are eliminated from the system in the pro-
cedure (4), the network G(t) is reset to G(0) and con-
tinue the network evolution from the procedure (2). In
the present model, the time scale of cascades measured
by the step τ is assumed to be much faster than that of
the network growth measured by the step t, and the re-
laxation time of random walkers in a network is further
shorter than a single cascade step. We concentrate, in
this work, on the temporal evolution of networks in the
time scale of the network growth. Therefore, information
on the network G(t) at every end of the procedure (4) is
recorded to investigate the model.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our model includes several parameters and conditions.
These are the numbers of nodes Nini and edges Mini in
the initial network G(0), the topology of G(0), the load
carried by a single edge a, the node tolerance parameter
m, the number of edges of a newly added node µ, and
the functional form of the load reduction parameter r(N).
In this section, we fix these parameters as follows: The
initial network G(0) is a triangular ring with Nini = 3
and Mini = 3. The parameters a and µ are set as a = 2.0
and µ = 2, respectively. The value of m is chosen from
the range of 5.0 ≤ m ≤ 7.0. The function r(N) is set as
r(N) =


rmax for 2 ≤ N < Nini,
rmax(Nmax −N)
Nmax −Nini
for Nini ≤ N < Nmax,
0 for N ≥ Nmax.
(10)
This function decreases from its maximum value rmax to
zero as N increases. Since a cascade of overload failures
with r = 0 eliminates all nodes in any network, Nmax
gives a rough estimation of the maximum network size
in the dynamics. Here we set Nmax = 1, 000 and rmax =
1.0. We will explain later the reason why we adopt the
above parameter values and discuss suitable ranges for
the model parameters to obtain SOC character in the
network evolution.
A. Number of nodes and other network measures
We first examine the time dependence of the size of
the network G(t). Figure 1 shows the number of nodes
N(t) in G(t) for the first 104 time steps. The result clearly
demonstrates that the network cannot grow infinitely and
the size N(t) largely fluctuates by repetitive growth and
decay of the network. We can find some features in the
line shape of N(t). In the early stage, N(t) increases
almost monotonically with time, because the probability
that any of the nodes in the network fail is low due to
small N0(t) [= N(t−1)+1]. Namely, in this time region,
the expectation number of failed nodes is less than 1. Af-
ter this region, the expectation value becomes larger than
1 and some nodes fail in G0(t). However, since r[N0(t)] for
still small N0(t) is rather large, cascades are not widely
spread. Thus, N(t) for 400 <∼ t
<
∼ 800 keeps increasing
with relatively small drops. When N(t) becomes larger
than 800, r[N0(t)] is so small that a cascade of failures
5FIG. 1. (Color online) Time dependences of the number of
nodes N(t) in the network G(t) (thick black line) and number
of nodes NLC(t) in its largest component (thin red line). The
node tolerance parameter is set as m = 5.0.
never stops until all nodes are eliminated. Such complete
collapses occur at t = 1, 824, 4, 603, and 6, 374 in Fig. 1.
After a complete collapse, the system evolves in a simi-
lar manner to the evolution from t = 0. In addition to
N(t), we plot in Fig. 1 the size of the largest component
NLC(t) contained in G(t). The size NLC(t) basically fol-
lows the variation of N(t) at most of the time steps, but
sometimes NLC(t) drops substantially though N(t) does
not change so much. At these times, the network is de-
composed into small components by cascading overload
failures. The statistics of magnitudes of drops in N(t),
i.e., cascade sizes, will be argued in the next subsection.
We also calculated several quantities that character-
ize the network structure at time t. Figure 2 shows the
average degree 〈k〉, the clustering coefficient C, and the
average path length 〈l〉 of the network G(t) as a func-
tion of t. These quantities for the largest component of
G(t) take almost the same values as those for G(t). The
average degree fluctuates around 〈k〉 = 2(= µ) though
it becomes significantly larger than this value immedi-
ately after a complete collapse. We have confirmed that
the degree distribution P(k) of G(t) hardly depends on
time and decays exponentially for large k if N(t) is large
enough (not shown here). This is reasonable because
random attachment of new nodes and cascading failures
without introducing degree correlations make the net-
work topology similar to a homogeneous random graph.
The clustering coefficient C is quite small (C <∼ 10
−4),
except for G(t) at and just after complete collapses. At
a complete collapse, C is equal to 1 because G(t) is a
triangular ring at this time. The clustering coefficient,
however, rapidly decreases with the network growth by
random attachments. Sometimes C becomes equal to
zero, which implies that the network takes a tree (or for-
FIG. 2. Time dependences of the average degree (top), the
clustering coefficient (middle), and the average path length
(bottom) of the network G(t). The node tolerance parameter
is set as m = 5.0. These quantities for the largest component
of G(t) are not shown in this figure, because their line shapes
almost overlap with those for G(t).
est) structure. The average path length 〈l〉 of the net-
work at a complete collapse is obviously 1, and after that
〈l〉 increases gradually with relatively large fluctuations.
Considering that N(t) is less than 1, 000, 〈l〉 close to or
more than 10 is too large to regard the network as being
small world. Then, we can expect that G(t) giving very
large 〈l〉 has a fractal structure. Before discussing the
fractality of generated networks, it will be examined in
the next subsection whether our dynamical system ex-
hibits SOC behavior.
B. Avalanche size and self-organized criticality
Sudden drops of the network size N(t) found in Fig. 1
corresponds to decays of the network by cascading over-
load failures. Magnitudes of these drops represent scales
of cascading overload failures. Here we define the
avalanche size S(t) as the number of nodes that are re-
moved during a single cascade of overload failures occur-
ring at the time t. Figure 3 shows the avalanche size
S(t) obtained from N(t) shown in Fig. 1. The avalanche
size largely fluctuates even if one ignores huge S(t)’s at
complete collapses. Values of S(t) at most of the time
steps are less than 50, while on rare occasions S(t) ex-
ceeds 300. The inset of Fig. 3 demonstrates that these
avalanches occur intermittently with inactive intervals.
This intermittency suggests a possibility that the net-
6FIG. 3. Time dependence of the avalanche size S(t) obtained
from N(t) shown in Fig. 1. To make the figure easy to see,
cascades leading to complete collapses are eliminated from
the figure. The intermittency of cascades is found in the inset
that magnifies the main figure for 100 ≤ t ≤ 300.
FIG. 4. Distribution function W (T ) of the inactive time in-
terval T during which no overload failure occurs. The distri-
bution W (T ) is obtained from the dynamics up to t = 5×106
under the conditionm = 5.0. The inset shows the distribution
of N(t) in the same dynamics.
work dynamics possesses SOC characteristics. In order
to find further evidences of SOC dynamics, we exam-
ine the distribution function W (T ) of the inactive time
interval T between avalanches. The distribution W (T )
obtained from the dynamics under the same conditions as
those for Fig. 1 but continued up to 5× 106 time steps is
presented in Fig. 4. This figure clearly shows that W (T )
(a)
(b)
FIG. 5. (Color online) (a) Distribution function P (S) of the
avalanche size S and (b) the distribution function n(s) of
the cluster size s for different values of the node tolerance
parameter, i.e., m = 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0. The distributions P (S)
and n(s) are obtained from the dynamics up to t = 5 × 106.
In both panels, the distributions for m = 6.0 and 7.0 are
vertically shifted for clarity.
obeys a power law,
W (T ) ∝ T−η, (11)
in an intermediate region of T . The least-squares fit for
the data within 20 ≤ T ≤ 50 gives η = 3.00± 0.03. The
small hump near T ∼ 150 comes from a finite-size effect
related to the existence of the most probable network
size Ntyp. This size is about 700 for our choice of the
model parameters as depicted in the inset of Fig. 4. We
have confirmed the correlations between N(t) and S(t)
and between the inactive interval T after a cascade and
the cascade (avalanche) size S. These correlations and
Ntyp ∼ 700 lead the frequently-appearing time interval
at T ∼ 150.
The distributions of the avalanche size S for several
values of the node tolerance parameter m are presented
in Fig. 5(a). The avalanche size distribution P (S) also
7follows a power-law relation, i.e.,
P (S) ∝ S−λ. (12)
Our result indicates that the exponent λ does not depend
on m and is estimated as λ = 2.60 ± 0.02 for m = 7.0.
The rightmost hump in P (S) at around S ∼ 900 repre-
sents the contribution from complete collapses. The sec-
ond hump from the right corresponds to decays of large
networks to assemblies of dimers. Moreover, the broad
hump near S = 150 found in the result for m = 5.0 is re-
lated to the hump in W (T ) shown by Fig. 4. This broad
hump represents the typical avalanche size of cascades
from typical networks with Ntyp ∼ 700 nodes. There-
fore, these humps are attributable to finite-size effects
associated with our choice of the model parameters.
Figure 5(b) shows the cluster size distribution n(s) for
three different values of m. The cluster size s at time t
is the number of nodes in a component included in the
network G(t). The cluster size distribution function n(s)
is calculated from all components of the network at every
time step in the entire dynamics. The distribution n(s)
has a power-law form,
n(s) ∝ s−τ , (13)
as well as W (T ) and P (S). The exponent τ , calculated
as τ = 2.92 ± 0.02 for m = 7.0, is also independent of
m. In contrast to the distribution P (S), the influence of
complete collapses to n(s) is inconspicuous. This is be-
cause the size of a network just after a complete collapse
is Nini(= 3) and the number of components with s = 3
generated in the whole period of the network evolution
is extremely large compared to the number of complete
collapses occurring in the same period.
All the above results, namely the intermittency of
S(t) and the power-law forms of W (T ), P (S), and n(s),
strongly support that the dynamics of network structure
in our model exhibits SOC behavior. These results also
show that the universality class of self-organized critical-
ity does not depend on the node tolerance parameter m.
The relation to other parameters will be discussed later.
C. Fractal and small-world networks
As we mentioned in Sect. II A, a cascade of overload
failures gives a fatal damage to a connected network
G0 of size N0 if the load reduction parameter r is less
than rc(N0), and the giant component after a cascade at
r = rc(N0) has a fractal structure [57]. In the present
SOC model, on the other hand, r decreases with the net-
work size N0(t). For r[N0(t)] chosen as Eq. (10), the
parameter r decreases from a large enough value rmax
for N0(t) ≤ Nini to zero for N0(t) ≥ Nmax. Since any
network is completely collapsed by a cascade of failures
at r = 0, through the network growth, r[N0(t)] must
eventually encounter the critical value rc at which the
cascade of failures provides the percolation transition of
FIG. 6. Histogram of the number of pre-critical networks
just before critical cascades versus the size of the pre-critical
network. The histogram is obtained for the first 104 critical
cascades occurring in the dynamics under the condition m =
5.0.
the network. (Precisely speaking, the term “critical” is
not appropriate because N0(t) is finite. However, we use
this terminology by supposing the case that sufficiently
large networks are generated under suitable values of the
model parameters. The word “critical” in the rest of
this paper will be used in the same sense.) If a network
with the size N0(t) satisfying r[N0(t)] = rc experiences
a cascade of overload failures, we expect that the giant
component after the cascade has a fractal structure.
In the case of cascading failures starting with a fixed
connected network G0 of size N0 in which all the capac-
ities of nodes are definitely determined by their degrees
and the initial total load W0, the value of rc(N0) is theo-
retically calculated as addressed in the last paragraph of
Sect. II A [57]. In our SOC model, however, the capacity
of a node depends on the total load at the time when
the node was introduced in the system. Thus, the node
capacities in the network G0(t) depends strongly on the
past history of G0(t), and the critical load reduction pa-
rameter rc cannot be uniquely determined by the size of
G0(t). Since the theoretical method proposed by Ref. IV
is not applicable to dynamics governed by such hysteresis
effects, we need to examine numerically whether r[N0(t)]
of the network G0(t) is close to an unknown value of rc
peculiar to G0(t).
If r[N0(t)] of the network G0(t) is much larger than rc,
a cascade of overload failures, if any, eliminates only a
small fraction of nodes from G0(t) and does not change
the giant component size so much. On the other hand, a
cascade with r[N0(t)]≪ rc causes a complete collapse of
G0(t). If r[N0(t)] is close to rc, the cascade is marginal,
for which the size of the giant component after the cas-
cade must be much smaller than the original giant com-
ponent size of G0(t) but still much larger than Nini. From
the above consideration, we regard in this work a cascade
of overload failures at time t satisfying the following con-
8FIG. 7. (Color online) NB(lB) for giant components in crit-
ical networks generated by SOC dynamics under the condi-
tions m = 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0. The longitudinal axis indicates
NB(lB)/NB(1) averaged over 1, 000 realizations of critical net-
works. The results for m = 6.0 and 7.0 are vertically shifted
for clarity. The straight dashed line has the slope dB = 1.53
which is obtained by the least-squares fit for the data for
m = 7.0 from lB = 2 to 20.
ditions as a critical cascade whose load reduction param-
eter should be close to rc:
NLC(t)
NLC(t− 1)
≤ 0.5 and NLC(t) ≥ 100, (14)
where NLC(t) is the number of nodes in the largest com-
ponent of G(t). The specific values 0.5 and 100 in Eq. (14)
are not important as long as NLC(t)/NLC(t − 1) and
NLC(t) are much smaller and larger than 1, respectively.
In the sense of the percolation transition by cascading
overload failures, a network after completing a critical
cascade can be considered as a critical network Gc. Also,
we call a network just before a critical cascade a pre-
critical network Gpre. Figure 6 shows the histogram of
the number of pre-critical networks as a function of the
size of Gpre. This result indicates that critical cascades
are likely to occur on networks of size N(t) ∼ 700 for the
present parameter set. Considering that the most prob-
able network size Ntyp is also about 700 as shown by
the inset of Fig. 4, critical cascades take place frequently
during SOC dynamics. This means that critical networks
are generated very often by such cascades.
We study the fractal property of giant components
in critical networks. As we explained in Sect. I, if a
given connected network is fractal, the minimum number
NB(lB) of subgraphs of diameter less than lB required to
cover the network satisfies the relation
NB(lB) ∝ l
−dB
B , (15)
where dB is the fractal dimension of the network [9].
We calculate NB(lB) for giant components in 1, 000
FIG. 8. (Color online) NB(lB) for largest components in net-
works that first reach the size N(t) = 300 after complete col-
lapses in SOC dynamics under the conditions m = 5.0, 6.0,
and 7.0. The longitudinal axis indicates NB(lB)/NB(1) aver-
aged over 1, 000 realizations of such networks. The results for
m = 6.0 and 7.0 are vertically shifted for clarity. The dashed
lines are guides to the eye.
critical networks appearing in the dynamics by using
the compact-box-burning algorithm [22] and average
NB(lB)/NB(1) over these realizations, where NB(1) is
equal to the number of nodes in the largest component.
The results form = 5.0, 6.0, and 7.0 are plotted in Fig. 7.
These plots clearly demonstrate that the quantityNB(lB)
satisfies Eq. (15) and the fractal dimension dB does not
depend on m. The value of dB estimated from the re-
sult for m = 7.0 is 1.53 ± 0.01. It is interesting that
this fractal dimension is close to dB = 1.54 ± 0.01 that
has been computed for the giant component after a crit-
ical cascade starting with an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random
graph [57]. The topology of a pre-critical network Gpre
in SOC dynamics is not the same as that of the ER ran-
dom graph GER. In addition, the capacity of a node in
Gpre depends on the total load of the system when the
node was introduced, while the node capacity in GER is
determined by the degree of the node and a fixed ini-
tial total load W0. In spite of these discrepancies, it is
not surprising that both fractal dimensions are the same,
which implies the same universality class between perco-
lation transitions for Gpre and GER. This is because the
degree distribution of Gpre has an exponential tail, like
that of GER, and the node capacity distribution is not
wide, which behaves similarly to the distribution of N(t)
shown in the inset of Fig. 4.
Let us examine NB(lB) for off-critical networks. If a
network is far from criticality, we can expect that the
network has a small-world structure, because the net-
work formed by random attachment of new nodes has
many short-cut edges. For a small-world network, the
number of covering subgraphs NB(lB) decreases expo-
9(a)
(b)
FIG. 9. (Color online) (a) Time dependence of the number of
nodes NLC(t) in the largest component of the network G(t) in
the dynamics for m = 7.0. The arrows indicate the times at
which NB(lB)’s are calculated. (b) NB(lB)’s for largest com-
ponents in G(t1), G(t2), G(t3), and G(t4) from top to bottom.
Thin lines are guides to the eye. The rapid decrease of NB(lB)
for lB ≫ lco at t = t3 or t4 indicates that the largest compo-
nent has a small-world structure in a longer length-scale than
lco. The inset shows NB(lB) at t = t4 in a semi-logarithmic
scale.
nentially with lB, namely,
NB(lB) ∝ exp(−lB/l0), (16)
where l0 is a characteristic path length. We calculated
NB(lB) for networks (or their largest components if not
connected) that first reach the size N(t) = 300 after com-
plete collapses, and averaged NB(lB)/NB(1) over 1, 000
realizations of such networks in SOC dynamics. The re-
sults shown in Fig. 8 indicate the small-world property
of these networks. Our SOC model thus generates both
fractal and small-world networks in a single dynamics.
We further investigate the crossover behavior from
fractal to small-world structure associated with the time
evolution from a critical network. Figure 9 illustrates a
typical profile change of NB(lB) for networks formed at
several times from t1 at which a critical network appears
to t4 just before the next complete collapse. The times at
which NB(lB)’s are calculated are indicated in Fig. 9(a)
by arrows on the time dependence of the largest com-
ponent size NLC(t). At t = t1, NB(lB) follows a power
law, which suggests that the giant component in G(t1)
has a fractal structure as we expect. After this time,
the largest component size rapidly increases as shown in
Fig. 9(a). This is because newly added nodes are more
likely to merge separated fractal components but less
likely to be connected onto a single component. There-
fore, the largest component at t = t2 remains fractal at
almost any scale. When the time elapses further, the in-
crease of NLC(t) becomes moderate. This implies that
the merging process of separated components has been
mostly finished and new nodes are simply incorporated in
the largest component. In this case, newly added nodes
bring short-cut edges in the largest component, which
makes the network small-world as shown by NB(lB) at
t = t3 in Fig. 9(b). More precisely, the network is small-
world in a longer length scale than the average distance
lco between terminal nodes of short-cut edges introduced
by new nodes, while it is fractal for lB ≪ lco. This sit-
uation is similar to the case that a lattice-like network
changes into a small-world one by random rewirings in
the Watts-Strogatz model [64] In fact, a high density of
short-cut edges at t = t4 reduces the crossover length lco
and the small-world property can be found in the whole
lB range as shown by the inset of Fig. 9(b).
D. Suitable choice of parameter values
All the above arguments are based on specific values
of the model parameters. If the dynamical properties
presented above are peculiar to these parameter values,
it cannot be said that the present model exhibits self-
organized criticality, because of the necessity of tuning
the external parameters. It has, however, been confirmed
that the results are essentially independent of the choice
of parameter values if these parameters lie in suitable
ranges. In this subsection, we discuss the suitable pa-
rameter ranges to realize SOC dynamics.
To find the suitable ranges of parameter values, let us
consider how large a network could grow if the system
did not experience any critical cascades and complete
collapses. Even in this case, a network cannot grow in-
finitely. The expectation number 〈S〉 of eliminated nodes
per unit time step increases with the network size N(t),
and eventually 〈S〉 reaches the incrementation of N(t) at
every time step due to the participation of a new node.
Once this is the case, the network does not grow any
more. The network size N(t) then fluctuates around a
stationary size with small amplitudes. The stationary
size Nst can be roughly estimated by the overload prob-
ability. In the absence of critical cascades and complete
collapses, we can consider approximately that all cascad-
ing overload failures stop at the first step of the cascade
process and subsequent avalanches triggered by the first
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failures do not occur, because avalanche sizes are small.
This approximation enables us to calculate the steady-
state expectation number of failed nodes per unit time
step by
〈S〉 = Nst
∑
k
Pst(k)FW (Nst)(k), (17)
where Pst(k) is the degree distribution of a steady-state
network Gst and FW (Nst)(k) is the overload probability of
a node of degree k in Gst. With the aid of the regularized
incomplete beta function, the probability FW (Nst)(k) is,
with reference to Eq. (3), given by
FW (Nst)(k) = Ik/µNst [⌊qµ(Nst)⌋+ 1,W (Nst)− ⌊qµ(Nst)⌋] ,
(18)
where
qµ(Nst) =
aµ
2
+m
√
aµ
2
(
1−
1
Nst
)
, (19)
and
W (Nst) =
aµNst
2
. (20)
Here, we approximated the average degree of Gst by µ
for the reason that nodes with degree greater than µ are
more likely to be eliminated by overload failures in Gst
while the average degree would be larger than µ (equal
to 2µ) if the network monotonically grew without any
node elimination. In the steady state, 〈S〉 must be equal
to the incrementation of the network size per unit time
step, namely 1. Therefore, the stationary size Nst is de-
termined by the relation,
Nst =
1∑
k Pst(k)FW (Nst)(k)
. (21)
If we neglect critical cascades and complete collapses, the
network can grow up to the size Nst obtained by solving
the above transcendental equation. But actually, the net-
work encounters critical cascades or complete collapses
before reaching this size if Nst is larger than the typical
size Npre of pre-critical networks Gpre. In this case, and
only in this case, critical cascades generate fractal net-
works, and the present model exhibits SOC character.
Otherwise, critical cascades themselves never take place
in the dynamics. Thus, the condition to realize SOC dy-
namics is
Nst ≫ Npre ≫ 1, (22)
where the conditionNpre ≫ 1 guarantees that the system
is large enough to exhibit genuine self-organized critical-
ity. What is the relation between the above condition
and the model parameters? Among several parameters
characterizing our model, parameters related to the ini-
tial network G(0), namely, Nini, Mini, and the topology
of G(0), are obviously irrelevant to the condition (22).
It is thus significant to elucidate how Nst and Npre de-
pend on a (the load carried by a single edge), m (the
node tolerance parameter), µ (the number of edges of a
newly added node), and the functional form of the load
reduction parameter r(N).
The stationary size Nst depends on a, m, and µ. Equa-
tion (21) reveals the relation of Nst to these parameters.
Since the preferential elimination of nodes with degree
much larger than µ in Gst gives a sharp peak of Pst(k) at
k = µ, Pst(k) hardly depends on Nst. Furthermore, the
overload probability FW (Nst)(k) presented by Eq. (18) in-
deed depends only very weakly on Nst, which comes from
the property of the regularized incomplete beta func-
tion. Therefore, Eq. (21) is not actually transcendental,
and Nst can be evaluated by Pst(k) and FW (N)(k) for
a haphazardly chosen value of N(≫ µ). The probability
FW (N)(k) given by Eqs. (18)-(20) with Nst replaced by N
is a decreasing function of m and µ for any k. Hence, Nst
obtained by Eq. (21) increases with m and µ regardless
of Pst(k). The a dependence of FW (N)(k) is, however,
influenced by the value of k. FW (N)(k) increases with a
if k > µ, while it decreases for k < µ. Meanwhile, for a
fixed value of a, FW (N)(k) for k < µ is negligibly small.
Thus, FW (N)(k) for k larger than µ dominates the sum-
mation in Eq. (21), independently of the form of Pst(k).
This fact and the property of FW (N)(k) of being an in-
creasing function of a for k > µ show that Nst decreases
with a. Consequently, we need to choose large values of
m and µ and a small value of a to obtain large Nst.
On the other hand, Npre is the typical size of a network
whose load reduction parameter r is equal to the criti-
cal value rc specific to the network. The parameter r is
uniquely determined by the network size N , while rc de-
pends not only on N but also on the past history of the
network. Approximating the typical size of pre-critical
networks by the size of a typical pre-critical network Gpre,
Npre must satisfy
r(Npre) = rc[Gpre(Npre)], (23)
where rc[Gpre(Npre)] is the critical load reduction param-
eter of Gpre whose size is Npre. Since the right-hand size
of Eq. (23) is a function of a, m, µ, and Npre, the size
Npre as the solution of Eq. (23) depends on these param-
eters in addition to the functional form of r(N). If r(N)
decreases slowly with N , however, the solution Npre is
mainly governed by the form of r(N) rather than the
precise value of rc. In order to satisfy Npre ≫ 1, r(N)
needs to decrease very slowly with the network size. In
the case that r(N) is set as Eq. (10), Nmax must be cho-
sen to be large enough.
In conclusion, the load reduction parameter r(N) must
decrease with N very slowly to realize the condition
Npre ≫ 1, and the node tolerance parameter m and the
load by edge a should be large and small enough, re-
spectively, so that Nst becomes much larger than Npre.
Although a large value of µ is preferable for the condi-
tion Nst ≫ Npre, results are not strongly influenced by
µ because the number of edges of a new node is always
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restricted by 2 ≤ µ ≤ Nini with small Nini. Our choice of
values for a, m, and µ in this section obviously satisfies
the condition Nst ≫ Npre, because we have critical cas-
cades in the dynamics. In fact, Nst estimated by Eq. (21)
with the numerically obtained Pst(k) is 861 for a = 2.0,
µ = 2, and m = 5.0, which is larger than Npre ≃ 700 as
indicated in Fig 6. We have confirmed that the univer-
sality class of self-organized criticality, namely the set of
the exponents η, λ, τ , and dB, does not depend on the
choice of parameter values if the condition (22) is satis-
fied. It has also been checked that the functional form of
r(N) is irrelevant to SOC dynamics as far as r(N) is a
slowly decreasing function of N .
IV. SUMMARY
We have proposed a model of self-organized critical
(SOC) dynamics of complex networks and presented a
possible explanation of the emergence of fractal and
small-world networks. Our model combines a network
growth and its decay due to the instability of large grown
networks against cascading overload failures. Cascad-
ing failures occur intermittently and prevent networks
from growing infinitely. The distribution of the inactive
time interval between successive cascades of failures has a
power-law form. Both the avalanche size that is the num-
ber of eliminated nodes in a single cascade and the cluster
size defined as the number of nodes in a connected com-
ponent also obey power-law distributions. These facts
indicate that the network dynamics possesses SOC char-
acteristics. During the SOC dynamics, the load reduc-
tion parameter r varies with the network size. When
r of the network coincides with its critical value rc, a
cascade of overload failures (critical cascade) decays the
network into a critical one. We have shown that giant
components just after critical cascades have fractal struc-
tures. The fractal dimension dB is close to that for the
giant component after a critical cascade starting with
an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph. In contrast, networks
far from criticality display the small-world property. In
particular, we demonstrated the crossover behavior from
fractal to small-world structure in a growing process from
a critical network, which is caused by short-cut edges in-
troduced by newly added nodes. We have also discussed
suitable parameter values to realize SOC dynamics.
It is significant to notice that the present model is
somewhat different from previous SOC models. In a
conventional SOC model, a routine procedure in the dy-
namics, such as placement of grains of sand in the sand-
pile model [25] or renewals of fitness values in the Bak-
Sneppen model [26], takes a system close to the criti-
cal point, but the instability of critical or near-critical
states drives the system away from criticality accompa-
nied by some sort of avalanches. In our model, on the
other hand, the network growth as a routine procedure
takes the system away from the critical point, but the
instability of large grown networks makes the network
critical. Although the roles of growth and instability are
opposite to those of conventional models, the system de-
scribed by our model exhibits the most of SOC charac-
teristics as explained in Sect. III. This implies that the
present model provides a new type of self-organized criti-
cality. Our model generates non-scale-free networks with
homogeneous degree distributions and belongs to a spe-
cific universality class of SOC dynamics, independently
of the choice of values of the model parameters. It is then
interesting to study how the model should be modified to
belong to another class of self-organized criticality with
forming scale-free networks.
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